

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 IO-14 DPW-01 AID-20 OMB-01 NEA-11

EUR-25 DRC-01 /166 W

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O R 140530Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1710

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 2004

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR VS

SUBJECT: ICCS: MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DHARSONO

1. I MET ON MONDAY FOR TWO HOURS WITH AMBASSADOR DHARSONO, CHIEF INDODEL TO ICCS, COVERING THE EVOLUTION SINCE 27 JANUARY 1973 OF THE SITUATION IN THE RVN. I WENT OVER IN GREAT DETAIL THE PERFECTLY PREDICTABLE PROGRESSION, AT LEAST TO THOSE OF US WHO HAD FOLLOWED THE 1954 AND 1962 GENEVA ACCORDS ON INDO-CHINA AND LAOS, THE DRVN HAD EXPECTED TO FOLLOW IN THEIR USE AND MANIPULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL MACHINERY.

2. I POINTED OUT THAT NOTHING HAD QUITE WORKED AS THE DRVN HAD PLANNED AND EXPECTED. THE INTENTION HAD BEEN TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ONLY THOSE PORTIONS OF THE AGREEMENT THAT WOULD HAVE FACILITATED THEIR CAMPAIGN TO WEAKEN THE GVN. AT THE SAME TIME THEY CONTINUED WITH THE BUILDING UP OF THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH THROUGH MASSIVE INFILTRATION OF MEN AND MATERIAL. THUS, THEY WOULD MASSIVELY VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 7, REFUSE TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 20 RELATING TO LAOS AND CAMBODIA BUT SCREAM FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARTICLES DEALING WITH DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES, FREEDOM OF CIRCULATION, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RECONCILIATION AND
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3. THEREFORE IT HAD BEEN WHOLLY UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THE DRVN/PRG WOULD HAVE PERMITTED FULL DEPLOYMENT OF THE ICCS FIELD TEAMS, THE DESIGNATION OF THE PORTS OF ENTRY, OR TO PERMIT THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF ANY OF THE OTHER MECHANISMS SET UP BY THE PARIS AGREEMENTS SUCH AS THE FPJMC, THE TPJMC, OR THE LA CELLE ST. CLOUD MEETINGS.

4. THEY HAD PLANNED TO USE THE SO-CALLED PRG CONTROLLED AREAS AS UNTOUCHABLE SANCTUARIES FROM WHICH THEY WOULD CONTINUE THEIR CAMPAIGN OF SUBVERSION, ASSASSINATION OF VILLAGE OFFICIALS, AND INCREASINGLY RAISING THE LEVEL OF THE INTENSITY OF THE VIOLENCE. THEY OBVIOUSLY HAD NEVER HAD ANY INTENTION OF OBSERVING EITHER OF THE TWO AGREED CEASE-FIRES EITHER IN JANUARY OR JUNE. THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF PERMITTING THE DELINEATION OF AREAS OF CONTROL, SINCE THEY HAD CONFIDENTLY EXPECTED TO EITHER ENLARGE THOSE AREAS CONSIDERABLY BEFORE PERMITTING DELINEATION, OR THAT THE GVN WOULD CRUMBLE WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF DIRECT AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN ITS DEFENSE.

5. LOOKING AT THE GVN A YEAR LATER, HANOI SEES THAT NOT ONLY HAVE NONE OF THEIR OBJECTIVES OF A YEAR AGO BEEN REALIZED, BUT ALSO THAT THE GVN IS STRONGER THAN EVER. INSTEAD OF A CRUMBLING INTO A POLITICAL DISARRAY, THEY SEE A GOVERNMENT OF THE GVN WHOSE SUPPORT BY THE RANK AND FILE OF THE 19 MILLIONS OF ITS PEOPLE IS GREATER THAN EVER. FURTHER HANOI SEES THAT THE PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF THE RVN BY THE PEOPLE IS SO IMPORTANT IN THIS CULTURE, IS BEYOND DOUBT PERVASIVE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE LAND.

6. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THEY SEE A STRONG AND EFFECTIVE ARMY AND AIR FORCE, WHICH HAS NOT PERMITTED THE SANCTUARIES TO GO UNPUNISHED WHEN HANOI HAS MOUNTED ATTACKS IN GVN TERRITORY.

7. THEIR ATTEMPTS AT PROSELYTIZING AND RECRUITMENT HAVE SIMPLY NOT GOTTEN ANYWHERE. THEIR TRADITIONAL ABILITY TO LIVE OFF THE LAND THROUGH THE PURCHASE OR CONFISCATION OF RICE FROM GVN TERRITORY HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED, LEAVING THEIR SOLDIERS IN A MOST PRECARIOUS SITUATION. AND FOR THE FIRST TIME, IN AN IRONIC REVERSAL OF ROLES, THE CAMBODIAN PROVINCES ADJACENT

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TO SOUTH VIET-NAM WERE HOSTILE RATHER THAN THE FRIENDLY SANCTUARIES OF THE PAST. ALTHOUGH CONTROLLED BY THE KHMER COMMUNISTS, THE DRVN FIND THEIR MARXIST BROTHERN ACTUALLY BRINGING THE NVA FORCES UNDER ATTACKS BY FIRE SO INTENSIVE THAT MANY HAVE HAD TO MOVE ACROSS THE BORDER INTO SVN.

8. ADDED TO ALL THIS IS THE INCREASING CONVICTION OF HANOI THAT, DUE TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S INFLUENCE, THEY WILL BE

UNABLE TO AGAIN DEPEND ON EITHER MOSCOW OR PEKING FOR RE-
PLACEMENT OF THE ARMAMENTS THEY HAVE MOVED SOUTH SHOULD
THEY RISK ANOTHER 1972-TYPE OFFENSIVE. TO RISK IT WOULD NOW RE-
ALLY BE RISKING IT ALL ON THE CAST OF THE DICE. SINCE, FOR A FULL
YEAR THE GVN HAD NOT ONLY HELD ITS OWN - ON ITS OWN - BUT HAD
HANDED OUT MORE PUNISHMENT THAN IT RECEIVED, SUCH A GAMBLE
MUST BE RATHER UNAPPETIZING.

9. EVEN THEIR POLISH AND HUNGARIAN FRIENDS KNOW THAT INSTEAD
OF EXPANDING THE AREAS OF CONTROL OF THE PRG/NVA FORCES, THEY
NOW CONTROL LESS THAN A YEAR AGO- BY HUNGARIAN ESTIMATES
AS MUCH AS 20 PERCENT LESS. I SAID WE THOUGHT THIS ESTIMATE
A BIT HIGH.

10. ALSO I TOLD AMBASSADOR DHARSONO, HANOI FOUND ON DECEMBER
20 THAT THE AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE RVN WAS STILL PRECISELY
AS STRONG AS WE SAID IT WOULD BE A YEAR AGO.

11. AND THEN, FINALLY, I SAID IT SEEMED INCREASINGLY CLEAR
THAT, AT THE RECENT PLENUM IN HANOI, THE NECESSITY TO FACE THE
ECONOMIC STAGNATION IN THE DRV, TO REALIZE THAT A CHOICE
BETWEEN "GUNS AND BUTTER" COULD NO LONGER BE POSTPONED, HAD
RESULTED IN A DECISION THAT, FOR A WHILE AT LEAST, THE DECISION
SIMPLY HAD TO BE FOR "BUTTER".

12. ALTHOUGH THE LOGIC OF THE SITUATION WOULD HAVE SEEMED
TO COMPET SUCH A DECISION, I SAID I HAD LEARNED NEVER TO BE
CERTAIN THAT THEIR ACTIONS WOULD REALLY BE WHOLLY GOVERNED
BY LOGIC.

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O R 140530Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
*O AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1711

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF : SAIGON *004

13. NEVERTHELESS, I THOUGHT *OME CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM SEEMED TO BE JUSTIFIED. IT NEW SEEMED, A YEAR LATER, THAT IT MIGHT BE PERVEIVED BY HANOI TO BE IN ITS INTERESTS TO ACCEPT FULLER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ICCS THAN HAD HERE-TOFORE BEEN POSSIBLE. THE CURRENT PROGRESS ON THE EXCHANGE OF THE REMAINING CIVILIAN PRISONERS, IF HANOI PERMITTED THE PROCESS TO CONTINUE TO COMPLETION, MIGHT BE SO INTERPRETED. IF SO, THE NEXT STEP MIGHT WELL BE A LESSENING OF THE INTENSITY OF THE VIOLENCE, ALTHOUGH I DID NOT PERSONALLY THINK THAT ANOTHER FORMAL CEASE-FIRE WAS EITHER POSSIBLE OR EVEN DESIRABLE. WHAT MIGHT WELL HAPPEN COULD BE A TACIT ACCEPTANCE OF BOTH SIDES THAT A LOWERING OF THE INTENSITY OF THE VIOLENCE WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. IF SO THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ICCS AS A CATALYST IN THIS PROCESS WAS ESSENTIAL TO ANY PROSPECT OF ITS SUCCESS.

14. I SAID I HOPED VERY MUCH THAT THE FRUSTRATIONS THE INDO-NESIAN DELEGATION HAD UNDERGONE IN THE PAST YEAR MIGHT, IN THE RETROSPECTION OF THE NEXT ANNIVERSARY, SEEM TO HAVE BEEN A PROCESS OF PREPARATION FOT THE CONSTRUCTIVE ACHIEVEMENTS WE ALL HOPED THE ICCS MIGHT MAKE IN THE COMING YEAR. I SAID I COULD CONVEY SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PERSONAL ADMIRATION FOR THE STEADFASTNESS AND COURAGE AMBASSADOR DHARSONO HAD DISPLAYED
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DURING THE PAST DIFFICULT YEAR. I SAID WE WERE ALL WELL AWARE THAT HE MUST HAVE FELT VERY MUCH ALONE WHILE THE IRANIAN DELEGATION WAS FEELING ITS WAY IN A NEW EXPERIENCE FOR IRAN FOR WHICH IT HAD NO PRECEDENT TO GUIDE IT.

15. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION I SAID THAT WE AGREED COMPLETELY WITH THE NECESSITY TO HAVE FULL ICCS DEPLOYMENT TO THE TEAM SITES AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OTHER SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS LAID DOWN IN THE PARIS AGREEMENTS. I SAID WE SAW NO REASON TO BE INFLEXIBLE ON MAINTENANCE OF THE FULL 290 STAFFING PATTERN MENTIONED IN THE AGREEMENTS AS LONG AS THERE WAS NO COMPROMISE ON THE OTHER REQUIREMENTS. WE AGREED THAT, SINCE IT HAD NOT BEEN CONTEMPLATED IN PARIS THAT SO MUCH OF THE HEADQUARTERS TAKS WOULD BE DONE BY CONTRACT, THE FULL DEPLOYMENT WAS NOT NEEDED. AMBASSADOR DHARSONO SAID HE THOUGHT THE INDONESIAN DELEGATION COULD PERFORM ALL ITS REQUIRED RESPONSIBILITIES WITH A STAFFING OF ABOUT 200. I SAID THIS WOULD BE PERFECTLY AGREEABLE TO US.

16. HE AGAIN ASKED ABOUT THE BUDGET, SAYING DRVN OFFICIALS IN HANOI PLEADED THEIR INABILITY TO PAY AND THAT SECRETARY

KISSINGER HAD SAID THE USG WOULD PAY THEIR SHARE. I SAID THAT WAS NOT TRUE. SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD ONLY SAID HE WOULD LOOK AT THE PROBLEM ONLY WHEN THE ICCS FORMALLY ACTED ON BOTH THE REVISED BUDGET FOR THE PRESENT PERIOD AND ALSO FOR THE NEW YEAR BEGINNING 1 APRIL. I SAID THAT IF THE NEW BUDGET DID NOT EXCEED 24 OR 25 MILLION WE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE CONVERGED BUT THAT HANOI AND THE SO-CALLED PRG MUST OBVIOUSLY PAY SOME PART.

17. AMBASSADOR DHARSONO SAID HE WOULD BE REPORTING TO JAKARTA ON 14 FEBRUARY AND WAS MUCH RELIEVED BY MY COMMENTS. I REITERATED AGAIN OUR ADMIRATION FOR THE WAY HE AND AMBASSADOR IDRIS HAD MET THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. I SAID THAT EVERYONE OWED A PARTICULAR DEBT OF GRATITUDE TO DIRECTOR GENERAL NUR WHO HAD PROBABLY HAD THE MOST DIFFICULT OF ALL INTERNATIONAL JOBS, NOT KNOWING FROM MONTH TO MONTH WHAT RESOURCES MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM. I SAID WE ALL WISHED HIM THE VERY BEST IN HIS NEW ASSIGNMENT WHEN HE DEPARTED ON 26 FEBRUARY.

18. I ASKED THAT HE CARRY MY PARTICULAR REGARDS TO ADAM MALIK AND TO MY FORMER INDONESIAN COLLEAGUE IN BANGKOK, AMBASSADOR MOHAMED DIAH.

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